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VERITION PARTNERS MASTER FUND LTD. V. ARUBA 
NETWORKS, INC.: DEAL PRICE AS A CEILING IN STATUTORY 
APPRAISAL ACTIONS 
ALYSSA TESTO* 
In Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc.,1 the 
Delaware Supreme Court addressed whether the lower court properly 
determined the fair value of stockholder shares in an appraisal proceeding.2  
The court held the Delaware Court of Chancery3 abused its discretion when 
it used the unaffected thirty-day market price average4 as fair value5 over the 
deal price less synergies.6  The court correctly held that there is no definitive 
formula for determining fair value but that the deal price less synergies 
                                                          
© 2020 Alyssa Testo 
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  The 
author dedicates this Note to her husband, Nicholas Testo.  This Note, and law school in general, 
would not have been possible without his unwavering love, patience, and sacrifice.  Additionally, 
the author wishes to thank her friends and family for their support and encouragement.  The author 
would also like to thank Professor William J. Moon for his guidance and invaluable feedback 
throughout the writing process.  Finally, the author wishes to thank the editors and staff of the 
Maryland Law Review for their hard work and assistance in publishing this Note.    
 1.  210 A.3d 128 (Del. 2019) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 2.  Id. at 130.  Appraisal proceedings are cases brought by minority shareholders dissenting 
from a merger who argue the deal price was inadequate.  Appraisals are a statutory right that allow 
for the judiciary to assess the fair value of the shares.  See infra Section II.A for a more detailed 
discussion.   
 3.  This Note will refer to the Delaware Court of Chancery as the “Delaware Court of 
Chancery,” the “court of chancery,” and the “chancery court” interchangeably, and the Delaware 
Supreme Court as the “Delaware Supreme Court” or the “court.” 
 4.  The unaffected thirty-day market price average is “the thirty-day average market price at 
which . . . shares [were] traded before the media reported news of the [merger].”  Aruba, 210 A.3d 
at 129. 
 5.  Fair Value and Fair Market Value (“FMV”) should not be confused here.  Fair value is  
[t]he value ascribed to stock or partnership interests in a corporation or other entity when 
those interests are involuntarily sold because of the actions of the entity’s majority or 
controlling owners.  Fair value is used when fair market value would be inequitable to a 
dissenter or involuntary seller, as in a merger or squeeze-out.  The fair value of a 
dissenting shareholder’s stock is generally determined without applying the marketability 
or minority discounts that would apply in a fair-market-value determination.   
Value, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  Whereas FMV is “[t]he price that a seller is 
willing to accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the open market and in an arm’s-length transaction.  
Id. 
 6.  Aruba, 210 A.3d at 130.  For a definition of deal price less synergies, see infra note 7.  
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approach7 was the best indicator of fair value because the merger was a fully 
informed,8 arm’s-length transaction,9 that resulted from a robust sales 
process.10  The practical result of the court’s holding will likely be a decline 
in appraisal proceedings, more specifically appraisal arbitrage,11 in fully 
informed, arm’s-length transactions.12  This is because the incentives of 
appraisal arbitrage are removed by the Aruba holding.13  The deal price likely 
will now serve as the ceiling for fair value determinations, and the likelihood 
of the court awarding a fair value over the agreed upon deal price, in fully 
                                                          
 7.  A requirement of Delaware General Corporation Law section 262 is that the determination 
of fair value of shares must exclude any amount attributable to synergistic merger gains.  DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2018).  Synergy, used in the merger context, is “the concept that the combined 
value and performance of two companies will be greater than the sum of the separate individual 
parts.”  Adam Barone, Synergy, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 10, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/synergy.asp.  A strategic bidder in a merger transaction 
generally includes synergistic value in their offered deal price.  DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value 
Partner, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 371 (Del. 2017) (“Part of why the synergy excision issue can be 
important is that it is widely assumed that the sales price in many M&A deals includes a portion of 
the buyer’s expected synergy gains, which is part of the premium the winning buyer must pay to 
prevail and obtain control.”).  Deal price less synergies, then, is the calculation of fair value using 
the agreed upon deal price of the merger minus any synergistic value included in the deal price. 
 8.  Fully informed, in the merger context, means the level of information buyers have access 
to regarding the seller’s business.  The deal price is likely to be considered fair when buyers are 
“fully informed” when accepting a deal price.  For example, in DFC, the Delaware Supreme Court 
emphasized that “a merger . . . against the back drop of a rich information base . . . is probative of 
the company’s fair value.”  172 A.3d at 366 (emphasis added).  Access to material, nonpublic 
information also lends to a transaction being fully informed.  Aruba, 210 A.3d at 140. 
 9.  An arm’s-length transaction is “[a] transaction between two unrelated and unaffiliated 
parties,” or “a transaction between two parties, however closely related they may be, conducted as 
if the parties were strangers, so that no conflict of interest arises.”  Transaction, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  The importance of an arm’s-length transaction is the assumption that 
no conflict of interest and relatively equal bargaining power will result in a fair deal price. 
 10.  See infra Section IV.A.  A robust sales process, in this case, refers to the degree of 
competition and barriers to entry in the sale process of the merger.  Low barriers to entry for 
potential buyers and higher degrees of competition lead to a “robust sales process” and lend support 
to deal price as fair value.  See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136–39, 142 (holding deal price less synergies 
was indicative of fair value where six potential buyers were contacted and none were interested); 
Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 28 (Del. 2017) (finding a 
competitive sale process where Silver Lake competed with interested parties “at every stage, both 
pre-signing and during the go-shop”); DFC, 172 A.3d at 350, 376 ( finding a “competitive process 
of bidding” where “every logical buyer” was contacted, three potential buyers expressed interest, 
and two engaged in negotiations, as well as, citing “failure of other buyers to pursue the company 
when they had a free chance to do so” as a factor).  
 11.  Appraisal arbitrage is the practice of hedge funds purchasing shares of a corporation set to 
be acquired in a merger with the intention of asserting appraisal rights to obtain a fair value judgment 
above the deal price.  Richard A. Booth, The Real Problem with Appraisal Arbitrage, 72 BUS. LAW. 
325, 325 (2017). 
 12.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 13.  See infra Section IV.B. 
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informed, arm’s-length transactions with a robust sales process, is greatly 
diminished.14   
After synthesizing Delaware’s appraisal jurisprudence, this Note calls 
for the Delaware legislature to amend section 262 of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law to reduce judicial uncertainty in fair value determinations.15  
Despite the chancery court’s lauded expertise in business law, the judge’s 
themselves have called for changes to the Delaware appraisal process and 
readily admit they are uncertain or feel unqualified to make fair value 
determinations.16  But, because the statute plainly requires the chancery court 
to make the determination, they are barred by statute from utilizing neutral 
valuation experts.17  By amending the statute to mandate a court-appointed 
valuation expert, judicial uncertainty in fair value determinations could be 
reduced, if not eliminated.18 
I. THE CASE 
Hewlett-Packard Company (“HP”) approached Aruba Networks, Inc. 
(“Aruba”) about a potential merger19 in August 2014.20  Aruba proceeded to 
negotiate with HP and also shopped the deal to five other bidders, but none 
showed any interest.21  After much back-and-forth negotiation, Aruba 
accepted HP’s offer of $24.67 per share at a time when its stock price was 
$18.37.22  Two weeks later, news of the deal leaked to the media and Aruba 
released its quarterly results, which beat analyst expectations, causing 
Aruba’s stock to jump to $24.81 per share.23  Shortly after news of the deal 
leaked, Aruba and HP formally announced the merger at a price of $24.67 
                                                          
 14.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 15.  See infra Section IV.C. 
 16.  See infra Section IV.C. 
 17.  See infra Section IV.C. 
 18.  See infra Section IV.C. 
 19.  A merger is “[t]he absorption of one organization . . . that ceases to exist into another that 
retains its own name and identity and acquires assets and liabilities of the former.” Merger, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 20.  Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 130 (Del. 2019) 
(en banc) (per curiam). 
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id.  
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per share and a final passive market check24 was permitted, but no superior 
bid emerged.25  The deal closed on May 18, 2015.26 
Stockholders, Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. and Verition Multi-
Strategy Master Fund Ltd. (together, “Verition”) petitioned the Delaware 
Court of Chancery for appraisal of fair value of shares in Aruba after its 
merger with HP was finalized.27  Appraisal is a shareholder’s right 
guaranteed under Delaware General Corporation Law section 262.28  Both 
parties advocated for their preferred fair value calculation.29  After the trial, 
the Vice Chancellor—sua sponte—requested supplemental briefing from the 
parties in response to the Supreme Court of Delaware’s opinion in Dell, Inc. 
v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd.,30 which was published 
shortly after post-trial oral arguments.31  In the supplemental briefs, Aruba 
dropped deal price less synergies as its preferred fair value calculation.32  
Aruba then argued, for the first time, that its preannouncement stock price 
(the thirty-day average unaffected market price) of $17.13 per share was the 
fair value.33  The court of chancery, in its post-trial opinion, agreed with 
Aruba’s post-trial supplemental brief that the fair value of the stock was its 
thirty-day average unaffected market price of publicly traded shares at $17.13 
per share.34  According to Vice Chancellor Laster, the thirty-day unaffected 
market price was the better fair value calculation because the deal price less 
synergies valuation method35 continued to incorporate theoretical reduced 
agency costs, an element of value from the merger that inflated Aruba’s value 
as a going concern.36  After the court of chancery issued its opinion, Verition 
                                                          
 24.  A market check is a search, typically conducted by the seller in a merger transaction, to 
determine whether other interested buyers will bid more than the proposed deal price.  Glossary of 
Stock Market Terms, NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/glossary/m/market-check.  A market 
check—whether active or passive—in a change-of-control transaction, such as the one here, is 
necessary for compliance with Delaware’s Revlon Doctrine (which will not be discussed in this 
Note).  Kobi Kastiel, Delaware Supreme Court Holds That Revlon Does Not Require Active Market 
Check, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 24, 2015), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/01/24/delaware-supreme-court-holds-that-revlon-does-not-
require-active-market-check/. 
 25.  Aruba, 210 A.3d at 130. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id.; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a), (h) (2018) (granting dissenting stockholders the 
statutory right to an appraisal by the court of chancery for determination of the fair value of the 
shares exclusive of any element of value arising from the merger).   
 29.  Aruba, 210 A.3d at 131.   
 30. 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017). 
 31.  Aruba, 210 A.3d at 131.   
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id.  
 34.  Id.  
 35.  See supra note 7 for an explanation of the deal price less synergies valuation method. 
 36.  Aruba, 210 A.3d at 32. 
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moved for reargument, which the court denied.37  Verition appealed to the 
Delaware Supreme Court.38 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Appraisal proceedings are a statutory right granted to shareholders in 
Delaware.39  The purpose of an appraisal is to ensure petitioners “receive fair 
compensation for their shares in the sense that it reflects what they deserve 
to receive based on what would fairly be given to them in an arm’s-length 
transaction,” not to ensure they receive the highest possible value.40  Section 
II.A discusses the origins of Delaware’s appraisal statute.41  Section II.B 
examines the rise of statutory appraisal cases.42  Section II.C reviews 
valuation methods utilized in appraisal proceedings.43  Finally, Section II.D 
analyzes the progression of Delaware’s use of deal price as evidence of “fair 
value.”44 
A.  The Delaware Appraisal Statute 
Prior to the enactment of appraisal rights, major decisions about a 
corporation, such as mergers, required unanimity from stockholders of the 
corporation.45  This created a veto power and often allowed for a minority 
stockholder46 to obstruct corporate action.47  To address this problem, 
                                                          
 37.  Id. at 132 n.24. 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2018).  Delaware is not the only jurisdiction to grant 
appraisal rights.  Shareholders dissenting from a merger have a statutory right to an appraisal in 
virtually all jurisdictions.  19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2192 (2015). 
 40.  DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 371 (Del. 2017).  
 41.  See infra Section II.A.   
 42.  See infra Section II.B. 
 43.  See infra Section II.C. 
 44.  See infra Section II.D. 
 45.  See Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 455 (Del. Ch. 1934) (“At common law it was in 
the power of any single stockholder to prevent a merger.”); In re Appraisal of ENSTAR Corp., No. 
7802, 1986 WL 8062, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1986) (“At common law there was no provision for 
an appraisal because unanimous consent of the stockholders was necessary to warrant certain acts 
such as a consolidation or merger.”).  
 46.  A minority stockholder or minority shareholder is someone who owns less than fifty 
percent of the total shares of a corporation’s stock or someone who owns shares without voting 
control of the corporation.  Shareholder, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).   
 47.  In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. Civ. A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345, 
at *3, (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007) (“Historically, all major corporate decisions required unanimous 
shareholder consent.  This requirement created a veto power and allowed even a single shareholder 
to obstruct corporate action.”); see also Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 
(1941) (“At common law, unanimous shareholder consent was a prerequisite to fundamental 
changes in the corporation.  This made it possible for an arbitrary minority to establish a nuisance 
value for its shares by refusal to coöperate [sic].”). 
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legislatures enacted laws permitting corporations to effectuate fundamental 
changes without a unanimous vote.48  In return, appraisal rights were 
statutorily established to compensate stockholders for the loss of veto power 
and gave dissenters the right to recover the cash value of their shares.49 
In Delaware, the appraisal remedy is statutory.50  Appraisal was 
intended to provide dissenting shareholders a remedy for the loss of voting 
rights in a fundamental corporate activity through “an independent judicial 
determination of the fair value of their shares” being taken from them.51  If 
shareholders opt to seek appraisal, they forego their right to exchange shares 
at the negotiated deal price and instead accept the fair value for their shares 
as determined by the court of chancery.52  Under section 262(b) of the 
Delaware appraisal statute, appraisal rights are only available in mergers and 
consolidations,53 but the statute allows corporations to grant appraisal rights 
in other specified circumstances in its certificate of incorporation.54  For a 
stockholder to have a valid appraisal claim, they must first perfect their 
appraisal rights.55  To perfect their appraisal rights, the stockholder must 
deliver a separate written demand for appraisal to the corporation before the 
stockholder vote on the merger.56  A stockholder must also not vote in favor 
of the merger or consent to it in writing.57  Within 120 days following the 
effective date of the merger, any stockholder who has perfected their rights 
may file for appraisal in the court of chancery.58  Through an appraisal 
                                                          
 48.  See In re Appraisal of ENSTAR Corp., 1986 WL 8062, at *5 (“Ever since 1899 Delaware 
law has permitted a stockholder’s interest to be terminated by the payment of its value in the case 
of a [merger] . . . . Initially a super majority vote of all the stockholders was required, but now only 
a simple majority need approve a merger . . . .”).   
 49.  See Ala. By-Prods. Corp. v. Cede & Co., 657 A.2d 254, 258 (Del. 1995) (describing 
appraisal as “a limited legislative remedy developed initially as a means to compensate shareholders 
of Delaware corporations for the loss of their common law right to prevent a merger or consolidation 
by refusal to consent to such transactions”); In re Appraisal of ENSTAR Corp., 1986 WL 8062, at 
*5 (“The granting of appraisal rights to a dissenting stockholder . . . was given, at least in part, in 
compensation for the lost right of the minority to defeat a merger.”).  
 50.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2018); see Kaye v. Pantone, Inc., 395 A.2d 369, 374 (Del. 
Ch. 1978) (“The right to an appraisal in a merger proceeding is entirely a creature of statute.”). 
 51.  Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, 177 A.3d 1, 19 (Del. 2017) 
(citing Ala. By-Prod. Corp., 657 A.2d at 258). 
 52.  tit. 8, § 262; see Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 873 A.2d 305, 312 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“‘[A] 
stockholder who seeks appraisal must forego all of the transactional consideration and essentially 
place his investment in limbo until the appraisal action is resolved.’  As part of this risk, a minority 
stockholder faces the prospect of receiving less than the [deal] price in the appraisal action.” (citing 
Turner v. Bernstein, 776 A.2d 530, 547–48 (Del. Ch. 2000)).  
 53.  tit. 8, § 262(b). 
 54.  Id. § 262(c). 
 55.  Id. § 262(d).  
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. § 262(a).  
 58.  Id. § 262(e). 
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proceeding, the chancery court is charged with using all relevant factors to 
determine “the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value 
arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger.”59  Following 
its decision, the court of chancery directs payment of the appraised amount, 
in addition to interest, to each dissenting stockholder.60 
B.  The Rise of Statutory Appraisal Cases 
The appraisal remedy was long discarded as insignificant, but that was 
profoundly changed by appraisal arbitrage.61  Appraisal arbitrage is a 
common investment strategy in which stockholders, generally hedge funds, 
acquire shares after an announcement of a merger, with the 
specific intention of exercising the statutory stockholder appraisal 
right found in [section] 262; in the subsequent appraisal action the 
court awards the appraisal petitioners what the court determines to 
be the fair value of the target, which, if the target was undervalued 
in the transaction, represents a positive return on the arbitrage 
investor’s initial investment.62  
Dissenting stockholders are also incentivized to practice appraisal arbitrage 
because they are entitled to receive interest on the court’s fair value award at 
an above market rate, compounded quarterly, for the period the suit was 
pending.63 
The basic appraisal arbitrage opportunity granted by appraisal rights 
stems from In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.64  Section 262 
only allows shareholders who abstained or voted against the merger to assert 
appraisal rights.65  In the Transkaryotic decision, the court held that investors 
that buy target company shares after the record date for the vote on a merger 
can still assert appraisal rights.66  This decision gives a timing advantage to 
hedge funds because the hedge funds can delay purchasing shares until after 
                                                          
 59.  Id. § 262(h).  
 60.  Id. § 262(i).  
 61.  See Jay B. Kesten, The Uncertain Case for Appraisal Arbitrage, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
89, 89 (2017) (noting that appraisal arbitrage was “[l]ong dismissed as a ‘sleepy corporate [law] 
backwater’—rarely employed and economically insignificant” (quoting Charles R. Korsmo & 
Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1551, 1553 (2015))).   
 62.  Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., C.A. No. 8900–VCG, 2015 WL 67586, at *1 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015). 
 63.  tit. 8, § 262(h).  2016 amendments to section 262(h) allow corporations to prepay appraisal 
claimants an amount of their choosing to reduce the accrual of interest payments.  Id. 
 64.  No. Civ. A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007).  
 65.  tit. 8, § 262(a) (“Any stockholder . . . who has neither voted in favor of the merger . . . nor 
consented thereto in writing pursuant to § 228 of this title shall be entitled to an appraisal by the 
Court of Chancery . . . .).   
 66.  In re Transkaryotic Therapies, 2007 WL 1378345, at *3–*4.   
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they have reviewed information on the sale process, fairness of the price, and 
all other pertinent information at a time much closer to the merger date.67  
The chancery court, in its opinion, acknowledged the possibility of appraisal 
arbitrage but chose to defer to the legislature “to avoid the evil” of appraisal 
arbitrage.68 
Following Transkaryotic, a dynamic market for appraisal rights 
developed.69  The number of appraisal claims and overall value at stake has 
increased dramatically due to the tremendous growth of hedge funds using 
appraisal arbitrage to take advantage of the appraisal statute.70  From 2006 to 
2016, there was a consistent increase in appraisal petitions filed,71 including 
a sharp rise from 2012 to 2016, where appraisal suits in Delaware rose 267% 
according to an analysis of Bloomberg Law data.72  The ten most frequent 
petitioners who brought appraisal suits were mainly hedge funds and private 
equity firms that were actively pursuing arbitrage investment strategies.73  
These ten petitioners filed more than half of the 433 appraisal petitions filed 
between 2006 and 2018.74 
C.  Determining Fair Value 
Section 262(h) established the Delaware Court of Chancery’s mandate 
to determine the value of shares that qualify for appraisal.75  The Delaware 
                                                          
 67.  Philip Richter, Robert C. Schwenkel, David N. Shine & Gail Weinstein, The Rise of 
Delaware Appraisal Arbitrage: A Survey of Cases and Some Practical Implications, INSIGHTS: 
CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR, July 2014, at 18, 19–20.   
 68.  In re Transkaryotic Therapies, 2007 WL 1378345, at *5.  The Council of the Corporation 
Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association made two reform proposals in 2015 which were 
ultimately adopted.  Wei Jiang, Reforming the Delaware Law to Address Appraisal Arbitrage, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 12, 2016), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/05/12/reforming-the-delaware-law-to-address-appraisal-
arbitrage/.  The Council proposed a “de minimis exception,” which would require a minimum stake 
of $1 million or 1% stock of the company to seek appraisal and an “interest reduction amendment” 
that would reduce the pre-judgment interest rate paid on an award from an appraisal.  Id.  Notably, 
the Council did not propose legislation to overrule the Transkaryotic decision.  Id.  
 69.  Kesten, supra note 61, at 104. 
 70.  Craig Boyd, Appraisal Arbitrage: Closing the Floodgates on Hedge Funds and Activist 
Shareholders, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 497, 503 (2016). 
 71.  DAVID F. MARCUS, FRANK SCHNEIDER, CHARLIE COSTELLO & YANLEI MA, 
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, APPRAISAL LITIGATION IN DELAWARE: TRENDS IN PETITIONS AND 
OPINIONS 2006–2018 1, 4 (2019), https://www.cornerstone.com/publications/reports/appraisal-
litigation-delaware-2006-2018. 
 72.  Michael Greene, M&A Deal Price Challenges Spiking in Delaware, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 
17, 2017, 2:41 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/m-a-deal-price-
challenges-spiking-in-delaware. 
 73.  Marcus, supra note 71, at 5.   
 74.  Id.  
 75.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2018) (“[T]he Court shall determine the fair value of the 
shares exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the 
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Supreme Court, in Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye,76 explained the concept 
of value from the statutory mandate: 
The basic concept of value under the appraisal statute is that the 
stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been taken from 
him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going concern.  By value 
of the stockholder’s proportionate interest in the corporate 
enterprise is meant the true or intrinsic value of his stock which has 
been taken by the merger.  In determining what figure represents 
this true or intrinsic value, the appraiser and the courts must take 
into consideration all factors and elements which reasonably might 
enter into the fixing of value.  Thus, market value, asset value, 
dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise and any 
other facts which were known or which could be ascertained as of 
the date of the merger and which throw any light on future 
prospects of the merged corporation are not only pertinent to an 
inquiry as to the value of the dissenting stockholders’ interest, but 
must be considered by the agency fixing the value.77  
The baseline objective of a statutory appraisal is to value the corporation as 
a whole entity, rather than as a specific fraction of shares belonging to a 
particular stockholder.78 
The statute provides further that fair value shall be determined 
“exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or 
expectation of the merger.”79  Therefore, value from potential synergies80 that 
will result from a merger is not considered in determining fair value.81  Fair 
value, then, is best described as “the value of the company to the stockholder 
as a going concern, rather than its value to a third party as an acquisition.”82  
                                                          
merger or consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to be 
the fair value.  In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant factors.”).   
 76.  74 A.2d 71 (Del. 1950).  
 77.  Id. at 72.  
 78.  Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 1988 WL 15816, at *8 (Del Ch. Feb. 22, 1988), aff’d 564 
A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).  
 79.  tit., 8 § 262(h). 
 80.  See supra note 7 for an explanation of synergies.  
 81.  See Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Hartnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989) (“[T]he company 
must be first valued as an operating entity by application of traditional value factors, weighted as 
required, but without regard to post-merger events or other possible business combinations.”); see 
also Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, 177 A.3d 1, 20–21 (Del. 2017) 
(describing what the Court is valuing in an appraisal proceeding); DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield 
Value Partner, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 371 (Del. 2017) (“Part of why the synergy excision issue can be 
important is that it is widely assumed that the sales price in many M&A deals includes a portion of 
the buyer’s expected synergy gains, which is part of the premium the winning buyer must pay to 
prevail and obtain control.”).   
 82.  M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 795 (Del. 1999).  
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The Court has recognized that fair value, over time, “has become a 
‘jurisprudential, rather than purely economic, construct.’”83 
In Weinberger v. UOP,84 the seminal case on Delaware statutory 
appraisal rights, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a proper valuation 
approach “must include proof of value by any techniques or methods which 
are generally considered acceptable in the financial community and 
otherwise admissible in court.”85  Weinberger also signified a large shift from 
prior valuation methodology by holding that valuation should include 
elements of future value that are known or susceptible to proof, excluding 
only speculative elements.86  The court adopted “a more liberal, less rigid and 
stylized, approach to the valuation process.”87 
The takeaway is that two important provisions from section 262 explain 
“what” the Court is valuing, and “how” the court should complete the 
valuation.  The “what” is that the Court “shall determine the fair value of the 
shares exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or 
expectation of the merger.”88  The “how” is the statutory requirement that 
“[i]n determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant 
factors.”89 
When determining value, the court should value the corporation as an 
ongoing business at the time of the merger and not as a specific fraction of 
shares.90  Therefore, the court should not apply a minority discount when a 
controlling shareholder exists, nor should the court include any value from 
synergies expected from the merger.91  Once a total value is determined, the 
court awards each dissenting stockholder the pro rata percentage of the 
total.92 
How the court determines fair value is difficult and fact-specific because 
the statute requires the court to “take into account all relevant factors,” giving 
                                                          
 83.  Dell, 177 A.3d at 20 (citing DFC, 172 A.3d at 367–68).  
 84.  457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 85.  Id. at 713. 
 86.  Id.  This was a large shift from Delaware’s long-time reliance on the “Delaware Block 
Method” which explicitly forbid elements of future value from the valuation determination.  Id. at 
712–13.  The Delaware Block Method is a combination of three generally accepted valuation 
methods: the asset approach, the market approach, and the earnings approach.  In re Radiology 
Associates, Inc. Litigation, 611 A.2d 485, 496 (Del. Ch. 1991).  While the courts infrequently use 
the Delaware Block Method after Weinberger, it is still considered an acceptable method for valuing 
a corporation.  Id.; see Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 940 (Del. 1985) (noting that 
Weinberger did not “abolish the block formula, only its exclusivity as a tool of valuation”). 
 87.  Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 704. 
 88.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit., 8 § 262(h) (2018).  
 89.  Id.  
 90.  Dell, 177 A.3d at 20.  
 91.  Id. at 20–21.   
 92.  Id. at 21.   
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consideration to “proof of value by any techniques or methods which are 
generally considered acceptable in the financial community and otherwise 
admissible in court.”93  After analyzing all relevant factors, the court may use 
a single valuation metric or two or more metrics by apportioning weight 
among a variety of methodologies.94  The appraisal process is flexible by 
design because every entity is different and every merger is different.95  
Regardless of the number of methodologies used or the weight given to each, 
the chancery court must “justify its methodology (or methodologies) 
according to the facts of the case and relevant, accepted financial 
principles.”96  Because appraisals are imperfect, the chancery court’s findings 
generally will be upheld so long as they are logical and grounded in relevant, 
acceptable financial methods.97 
Post-Weinberger, there are three recurring valuation techniques used in 
appraisal proceedings: (1) discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analyses; (2) 
valuations based on comparables (e.g., comparable companies or comparable 
acquisitions); and (3) deference to the deal price.98  Experts and Delaware 
Courts rely heavily on DCF analyses over other methodologies.99 
1.  Discounted Cash Flow Analysis 
Delaware courts most frequently use DCF analysis to determine the fair 
value of shares subject to appraisal despite recognizing concerns about the 
subjectivity of DCF models.100  The Delaware Supreme Court held in DFC 
                                                          
 93.  tit., 8 § 262(h); Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983).   
 94.  Dell, 177 A.3d at 22.   
 95.  Id. at 21.   
 96.  Id. at 22.   
 97.  Id. at 22–23; see also DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 
348–49 (Del. 2017) (“[T]his Court must give deference to the Court of Chancery if its determination 
of fair value has a reasonable basis in the record and in accepted financial principles relevant to 
determining the value of corporations and their stock.”); M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 
790, 795 (Del. 1999) (“The discretion to weigh the evidence [in a statutory appraisal proceeding] 
belongs to the Court of Chancery with our review one of abuse of that discretion.” (quoting In re 
Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1221 (Del. 1992))); In re Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1219 (Del. 
1992) (recognizing the Delaware Supreme Court defers to the Court of Chancery’s findings due to 
its expertise in appraisal cases); Levitt v. Bouvier, 287 A.2d 671, 673 (Del. 1972) (noting the 
Delaware Supreme Court will not ignore findings made by the Court of Chancery “[i]f they are 
sufficiently supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive 
process . . . even though independently [the Court may] have reached opposite conclusions”).  
 98.  Marcus, supra note 71, at 2.   
 99.  Id. at 10; see also Crescent/Mach I P’ship, L.P. v. Turner, Nos. 17455-VCN, 17711-VCN, 
2007 WL 2801387, at *10 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007) (“Although it is appropriate to consider all 
accepted methodologies, the Court tends to favor the discounted cash flow method . . . .”). 
 100.  See M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 523 (Del. 1999) (“The discounted 
cash flow methodology has been relied upon frequently . . . in other statutory appraisal 
proceedings.”); Onti, Inc. v. IntegraBank, 751 A.2d 904, 916 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“[S]ince the 
abolishment of the Delaware Block method for appraisals in 1983, this Court frequently has 
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Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P.101 that a DCF model is 
generally most helpful in transactions where there is not an observable 
market price because “a single person’s own estimates of the cash flows 
are . . . a good faith estimate by a single, reasonably informed person to 
predict the future.”102  The fundamental principle of DCF analysis is that the 
present value of a corporation’s projected cash flows is equal to the 
corporation’s value.103  DCF analysis uses three components:104 (1) cash flow 
projections,105 (2) terminal value,106 and (3) the discount rate.107  Once these 
three components are determined, the cash flows and terminal value are 
discounted to present value using the discount rate and added together to 
derive a total present value of cash flows.108  Then, the value of non-operating 
                                                          
employed the discounted cash flow [approach] as at least one method of valuation.”).  But see Dell, 
177 A.3d at 37–38 (“Although widely considered the best tool for valuing companies when there is 
no credible market information and no market check, DCF valuations involve many inputs—all 
subject to disagreement by well-compensated and highly credentialed experts—and even slight 
differences in these inputs can produce large valuation gaps.”).   
 101.  172 A.3d 346, 370 (Del. 2017). 
 102.  Id. at 370.   
 103.  Neal v. Ala. By-Prods. Corp., CIV. A. No. 8282, 1990 WL 109243, at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 
1, 1990).  
 104.  In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del. Ch. 1991) (“The DCF model 
entails three basic components: an estimation of net cash flows that the firm will generate and when, 
over some period; a terminal or residual value equal to the future value, as of the end of the 
projection period, of the firm’s cash flows beyond the projection period; and finally a cost of capital 
with which to discount to a present value both the projected net cash flows and the estimated 
terminal or residual value.”).   
 105.  Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. Civ. A. 7129, 1999 WL 65042, at *5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 
29, 1999) (“The first step of DCF is to project the company’s future income stream.”).  The chancery 
court in In re Radiology Associates notes that “[t]he quality of the projection as to the future benefits 
over some period . . . is central to the reliability of the underlying methodology of the [DCF] 
method.” 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del. Ch. 1991).   
 106.  The terminal value is the present value of all of the company’s future cash flows beginning 
after the specific projection period.  Terminal Value, CORP. FIN. INST., 
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/valuation/terminal-value/ (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2020).  Terminal value calculations have been accepted by courts when derived as present 
value of the company’s cash flows projected in perpetuity or determined by a capitalized earnings 
approach.  Compare Onti v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 923 (Del. Ch. 1999) (calculating terminal 
value using “the Constant Growth Valuation Model . . . which is widely accepted as the best, even 
if imperfect, method to determine a terminal value for a discounted cash flow analysis”) with 
Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 1988 WL 15816, at *21 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1988) (calculating terminal 
value using the capitalized earnings approach with an average of three years of historical earnings 
and a capitalization multiple of 12), aff’d, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).  
 107.  In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d at 490, 492.  The discount rate determines 
the present value of the annual cash flows for the projection period and the terminal value.  Id.  “The 
selection of an appropriate discount rate has a profound effect on the share price in an appraisal 
action.”  Crescent/Mach I P’ship, L.P. v. Turner, Nos. 17455-VCN, 17711-VCN, 2007 WL 
2801387, at *12 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007).   
 108.  See Cede & Co., 1999 WL 65042, at *5 (“[B]y adding the current year’s cash flows to the 
discounted values of each future year’s income (including the last year’s lump-sum terminal value), 
one arrives at the net present value (“NPV”) of the enterprise.”).   
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assets109 is added and the total is divided by the number of outstanding shares 
to reach the fair value per share of the company.110  The DCF analysis 
“purports to represent the present value of [the corporation’s] cash flow” 
which reflects the shareholder’s proportionate “value without need for an 
adjustment.”111 
2.  Valuations Based on Comparables 
Valuations based on comparables such as a Comparable Companies 
Approach or Comparable Acquisitions (Transactions) Approach are 
sometimes used to determine fair value.112  The comparables approach is 
based on the same premise as the DCF method, except instead of directly 
estimating the company’s future cash flows and reducing them to present 
value, the comparables method infers the future growth of the subject 
company using future expected cash flows from the market’s expectations 
about comparable companies or transactions.113  Comparable analyses 
determine the value of a company using the metrics of other businesses or 
transactions of similar size in the same industry, using the assumption that 
similar companies or transactions will have similar valuations.114  The 
comparable companies valuation method involves several steps including: 
(1) finding comparable, publicly traded companies that have 
reviewable financial information; (2) calculating the ratio between 
the trading price of the stocks of each of those companies and some 
recognized measure reflecting their income . . . ; (3) correcting 
these derived ratios to account for differences, such as in capital 
structure, between the public companies and the target company 
being valued; and finally, (4) applying the average multiple of the 
comparable companies to the relevant income measurement of the 
target company.115  
                                                          
 109.  Non-operating assets are assets that are not essential to a company’s ongoing business 
operations but may still generate income or provide a return on investment.  James Chen, Non-
Operating Asset, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 29, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nonoperatingasset.asp.  For example, an owned parcel of 
land with no plans for building or usage in the near future is a non-operating asset until it is used.  
Id.   
 110.  See In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d at 495 (“This Court clearly must add the 
value of non-operating assets . . . .”). 
 111.  Id. at 494.  
 112.  Marcus, supra note 71, at 10.   
 113.  In re Appraisal of Orchard Enters., Inc., C.A. No. 5713–CS, 2012 WL 2923305, at *9 (Del. 
Ch. July 18, 2012).   
 114.  James Chen, Comparable Company Analysis, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 17, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/comparable-company-analysis-cca.asp.   
 115.  Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., Civil Action No. 6247-VCP, 2013 WL 3793896, 
at *6 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013).  
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The comparable transactions analysis is similar to the comparable 
companies analysis.  The court of chancery in Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA 
Financial, Inc.116 described a comparable transactions analysis as, 
“identifying similar transactions, quantifying those transactions through 
financial metrics, and then applying the metrics to the company at issue to 
ascertain a value.”117  As with the comparable companies analysis, “[t]he 
utility of the comparable transactions methodology is directly linked to the 
‘similarity between the company the court is valuing and the companies used 
for comparison.’”118  Because the selection of comparators requires a 
necessary degree of subjective judgment, the court is directed to “closely 
evaluate whether a party who relies on a comparable transactions [or 
companies] analysis has met its burden of persuasion.”119   
The comparables approach is more useful for valuation in competitive 
industries with a large number of similar entities.120  Despite comparable 
analyses being credited as a valid valuation tool, it is not used much by the 
court when determining fair value.121 
3.  Deference to the Deal Price 
When considering the agreed upon deal price for the merger transaction 
as fair value, the court looks to the company’s stock market dynamics, the 
sale process, and the flow of information between parties to the 
transaction.122  But, the court is not required to give any amount of weight to 
the deal price.123  From 2006 to 2018, the court relied on deal price in 
determining fair value in thirty-eight percent of opinions, making it the 
second-most utilized methodology after DCF analysis.124  Deal price as fair 
value is discussed at length in the next Section.125 
                                                          
 116.  939 A.2d 34 (Del. Ch. 2007).  
 117.  Id. at 54. 
 118.  Id. (quoting In re U.S. Cellular Operating Co., C.A. No. 18696-NC, 2005 WL 43994, at 
*17 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2005)). 
 119.  Id. at 54. 
 120.  See In re Appraisal of Orchard Enters., Inc., C.A. No. 5713–CS, 2012 WL 2923305, at *9 
(Del. Ch. July 18, 2012) (“[T]he utility of a [comparables] method depends on actually having 
companies that are sufficiently comparable that their trading multiples provide a relevant insight 
into the subject company’s own growth prospects.  When there are a number of corporations 
competing in a similar industry, the method is easiest to deploy reliably.”). 
 121.  Marcus, supra note 71, at 10.   
 122.  Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 23 (Del. 2017).  
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Marcus, supra note 71, at 10.   
 125.  See infra Section II.D. 
 
2020] VERITION PARTNERS V. ARUBA NETWORKS, INC. 1071 
D. The Delaware Court’s Increasing Reliance on Deal Price as 
Evidence of “Fair Value” 
In Union Illinois 1995 Investment Ltd. Partnership v. Union Financial 
Group, Ltd.,126 the Delaware Court of Chancery initially held “[t]he [deal] 
price [was] the most reliable evidence of fair value.”127  Six years later, the 
Delaware Supreme Court took a firm stance against the use of deal price as 
fair value in an appraisal action in Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP.128  
Then, just three years after Golden Telecom, under similar facts, the 
Delaware courts began a slow return back to approval of deal price in Huff 
Fund Investment Partnership v. CKx, Inc.129  Subsequent cases took the same 
approach as CKx, relying exclusively on the deal price to determine fair 
value, in part because other valuation methods were unreliable.130  Beginning 
in 2015 with LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron International Corp.,131 
Delaware courts have consistently relied on deal price as the “best indicator” 
of fair value.132  This is likely due, in part, to In re Appraisal of 
Ancestry.com,133 which removed any restrictions on using deal price only in 
                                                          
 126.  847 A.2d 340 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 127.  Id. at 357–58. 
 128.  11 A.3d 214, 218 (Del. 2010). 
 129. C.A. No. 6844-VCG, 2013 WL 5878807, at *11–15 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013).  “In the 
absence of comparable companies or transactions to guide a comparable companies analysis or a 
comparable transactions analysis, and without reliable projections to discount in a DCF analysis, I 
rely on the [deal] price as the best and most reliable indication of CKx’s value.”  Id. at 11.   
 130.  See LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., C.A. No. 8094-VCP, 2015 WL 
4540443, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (finding that “the sales process in this instance was thorough 
and that the [deal] price less synergies provides the most reliable method of determining the fair 
value of the petitioner’s shares” because the DCF analysis, comparable companies approach, and 
comparable transactions approach are not reliable.); Merlin Partners LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., C.A. No. 
8509-VCN, 2015 WL 2069417, at *14, *18 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015) (finding that the sale process 
was “comprehensive” and that, at the same time, “there [was] no reliable data to input into a DCF 
or comparable companies model”).   
 131.  C.A. No. 8094-VCP, 2015 WL 4540443, at *25–26 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015).  
 132.  See DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 376 (Del. 2017) 
(“[W]e cannot sustain the Chancellor’s decision to give only one-third weight to the deal price . . . .” 
(emphasis added)); In re Appraisal of PetSmart, Inc., C.A. No. 10782-VCS, 2017 WL 2303599, at 
*40 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017) (“I ‘defer’ to deal price . . . because that is what the 
evidence . . . requires.”); Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., C.A. No. 8900-VCG, 2015 WL 
6164771, at *18 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015) (“[Deal] price . . . [is] the best indicator of fair value of 
BMC . . . .”); LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., C.A. No. 8094-VCP, 2015 WL 
4540443, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (“[Deal] price less synergies provides the most reliable 
method . . . .”); Merlin Partners LP, 2015 WL 2069417, at *16 (“[Deal] price appears to be the best 
estimate of value . . . .”); In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., C.A. No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 
399726, at *24 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) (“[Deal] price . . . is the best indicator of Ancestry’s fair 
value . . . .”).   
 133.  C.A. No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 399726 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015).  
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circumstances where other valuation methods are unreliable.134  The court’s 
trend of using deal price as fair value continued in its 2017 opinions in 
DFC135 and Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd.136  
The court determined in DFC that “economic principles suggest[ed] that the 
best evidence of fair value was the deal price” in the case of an arm’s-length 
merger arising out of a “robust market search” free of any “hint of self-
interest.”137  In Dell, the Court went even further to say: 
[W]hen the evidence of market efficiency, fair play, low barriers 
to entry, outreach to all logical buyers, and the chance for any 
topping bidder to have the support of [the founder]’s own votes is 
so compelling, then failure to give the resulting [deal] price heavy 
weight . . . abuses even the wide discretion afforded the Court of 
Chancery . . . .138 
Despite its increasing reliance on deal price as fair value, the court’s 
most recent decisions have continued to hold strong to the ideas that judicial 
discretion remains important, judges must take into account “all relevant 
factors,” and the court must not give presumption to deal price as fair 
value.139  The culmination of the case law surrounding deal price as fair value 
has led to the conclusion that in the proper circumstances, the courts can 
“select deal price to measure fair value, even if one or more other valuation 
techniques are reasonably reliable, simply because the deal price may be the 
‘most’ reliable evidence of fair value.”140   
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., the 
Delaware Supreme Court reversed the court of chancery’s fair value 
determination and held that the court abused its discretion in determining 
Aruba’s thirty-day average unaffected market price was the fair value of 
                                                          
 134.  Id. at *23 (relying exclusively on deal price as fair value despite acknowledging the DCF 
analysis was reliable).  
 135.  172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017).  
 136.  177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017).  
 137.  DFC, 172 A.3d at 349.  
 138.  Dell, 177 A.3d at 35.  
 139.  See DFC, 172 A.3d at 366 (“[N]ot only do we see no license in the statute for creating a 
presumption that the resulting [deal] price in such a situation is the ‘exclusive,’ ‘best,’ or ‘primary’ 
evidence of fair value, we do not share DFC’s confidence in our ability to craft, on a general basis, 
the precise pre-conditions that would be necessary to invoke a presumption of that kind.”); Dell, 
177 A.3d at 21–23 (noting the statutory burden placed on the chancery court to consider “all relevant 
factors” and echoing the doubts expressed in DFC on invoking a presumption).   
 140.  Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael V. Wachter, Finding the Right Balance in Appraisal 
Litigation: Deal Price, Deal Process, and Synergies, FAC. SCHOLARSHIP PENN. L. (2018),  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1954.   
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shares.141  The court reasoned that the decision to disregard the deal price less 
synergies as the proper fair value determination was “rooted in an erroneous 
factual finding that lacked record support.”142  On remand, the Delaware 
Supreme Court ordered a final judgement for Verition, awarding them $19.10 
per share, the deal price less synergies.143 
In coming to this conclusion, the Delaware Supreme Court entertained 
a number of corporate finance theories to properly evaluate fair value.  The 
court addressed the unaffected thirty-day average market price adopted by 
the court of chancery but discarded its use due to its time delay and lack of 
developed record on whether the stock price was an adequate representation 
of fair value.144  The court also considered the court of chancery’s record on 
a DCF analysis, comparable companies and comparable transactions 
analyses, and deal price less synergies.145  In the end, the court determined 
that a deal price less synergies approach in a fully informed, arm’s-length 
transaction following a robust sales process is the best determination of fair 
value and that relying on the average unaffected market price of the seller’s 
stock was not a reliable fair value determination.146 
To support its determination that deal price less synergies was the best 
indicator of fair value, the court first addressed the court of chancery’s 
reasoning as to why it decided not to use deal price less synergies.147  The 
Vice Chancellor posited in his lower court opinion that to meet statutory 
requirements an additional deduction from the deal price was necessary to 
account for “reduced agency costs” that arise from a merger.148  The court 
reasoned that while reduced agency costs is an added value in private equity 
deals, that was not the case here, because Aruba’s public stockholders were 
not being replaced with a concentrated group of owners as is the case in 
private equity deals.149  Instead, the HP-Aruba merger would simply swap 
out Aruba’s set of public stockholders for HP’s set of public stockholders, 
which would not create reduced agency costs.150  Further, the court cited that 
neither party presented any evidence to indicate that any part of the deal price 
                                                          
 141.  Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 129–30 (Del. 
2019) (en banc) (per curiam).   
 142.  Id. at 130. 
 143.  Id.   
 144.  Id. at 139–40. 
 145.  Id. at 142. 
 146.  Id. at 139–42  
 147.  Id. at 133–34. 
 148.  Id.  The reduced agency cost theory is that “the acquisition would reduce agency costs 
essentially because the resulting consolidation of ownership and control would align the interests of 
Aruba’s mangers and its public stockholders,” and, thus, add value to the company.  Id.   
 149.  Id. at 134. 
 150.  Id.   
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involved the potential for agency cost reductions that were not already 
included in its synergies estimate.151  The chancery court ignored the reality 
that HP’s synergies estimate likely already priced any agency cost reduction 
it may have expected.152  In addition, the record provided no reason to suspect 
those estimates omitted any additional added value HP thought it could 
achieve from the merger.153  Because of these factors, the Delaware Supreme 
Court considered Aruba’s synergies estimate accurate and did not require 
further deduction of reduced agency costs.154 
The Delaware Supreme Court next dispelled the lower court’s reading 
of DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P.,155 and Dell, Inc. v. 
Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund, Ltd.,156 that compelled its “rote 
reliance on market prices.”157  The court said “the trial judge’s sense that 
those decisions somehow compelled him to make the decision he did was not 
supported by any reasonable reading of those decisions or grounded in any 
direct citation to them,” and pointed to the Delaware judiciary’s long history, 
even prior to DFC and Dell, of “giving important weight to market-tested 
deal prices,” involving a public company sold at a substantial premium after 
the deal is shopped around to fair and viable bidders.158  Here, Aruba 
approached other logical buyers before signing the deal with HP, and HP had 
private information not available to the public when they made an offer above 
the then current market price of shares.159  The court placed great emphasis 
on market efficiency and recognized that a buyer is in a strong position to 
properly value the seller when it has material, nonpublic information about 
the seller, as was the case here when HP offered a premium purchase price 
of Aruba.160  The court determined that the deal price “should be given 
considerable weight . . . absent deficiencies in the deal process.”161  The court 
also acknowledged that while the price a stock trades at in an efficient market 
is an important indicator of fair value, when the deal is further informed by a 
buyer negotiating at arm’s-length, using confidential, non-public 
information, the deal price that results is even more likely to be indicative of 
fair value.162 
                                                          
 151.  Id.   
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id.  
 155.  DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017). 
 156.  Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017). 
 157.  Aruba, 210 A.3d at 135. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. at 136. 
 160.  Id. at 137. 
 161.  Id.  
 162.  Id. at 137–39. 
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Finally, the Delaware Supreme Court noted the court of chancery 
created due process and fairness problems by requesting post-trial briefing 
on the unaffected thirty-day average market price because “the extent to 
which the market price approximated fair value was never subjected to the 
crucible of pretrial discovery, expert depositions, cross-expert rebuttal, 
expert testimony at trial, and cross-examination at trial.”163  In conclusion, 
the court determined the deal price less synergies calculation of Aruba’s fair 
value was supported by “abundant record evidence,” and ordered a final 
judgment for Verition in the amount of $19.10 per share (the deal price less 
synergies) plus interest.164 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., the 
Delaware Supreme Court held that the chancery court abused its discretion 
in using Aruba’s thirty-day unaffected average market price, rather than deal 
price less synergies, as fair value of shareholders’ going concern in a fully 
informed, arm’s-length merger.165  Section IV.A discusses why the Court 
made the correct judgment in Aruba.166  The court made the correct judgment 
because it followed Delaware precedent, acknowledged that market-tested 
deal prices are the best indicator of fair value in a robust sales process and a 
fully informed, arm’s-length transaction, and removed the uncertainty of 
some corporate finance methodologies regularly employed in circumstances 
of non-efficient markets.167  Section IV.B considers why the number of 
statutory appraisal cases in Delaware will likely decline due to the Court’s 
holding in Aruba.168  Finally, Section IV.C explains why the Delaware 
legislature should amend Delaware General Corporation Law section 262 to 
avoid uncertainty in future fair value determinations.169   
A.  The Deleware Supreme Court’s Holding Is Correct 
The court in Aruba correctly determined the Delaware Court of 
Chancery abused its discretion in using the unaffected average thirty-day 
market price over deal price less synergies because the chancery court failed 
to recognize prior Delaware case law’s emphasis on well-informed deal 
prices following a non-conflicted, robust sales process.170  The Delaware 
                                                          
 163.  Id. at 139–40. 
 164.  Id. at 141–42. 
 165.  Id. at 130. 
 166.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 167.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 168.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 169.  See infra Section IV.C. 
 170.  See infra Section IV.A.1. 
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Supreme Court also properly recognized that an appraisal must be flexible 
due to the uniqueness of each merger.171  Finally, the court correctly 
acknowledged that an efficient market,172 as well as finance professionals, 
are best suited to make valuation determinations.173 
1.  The Court’s Holding Is Consistent with Precedent and Recognizes 
an Appraisal Must Be Flexible 
The Delaware Supreme Court has made clear that it will not adopt a 
presumption that the deal price reflects fair value because “Section 262(h) 
unambiguously calls upon the Court of Chancery to perform an independent 
evaluation of ‘fair value’ at the time of a transaction.”174  The court refuses 
to adopt such a presumption because each merger is unique, and, thus, 
creating a presumption or a single way to value a merger would be a 
fallacy.175  The Delaware Supreme Court, however, has a long history of 
giving important emphasis to market-tested deal prices, particularly in 
efficient markets.176 
The Delaware Supreme Court’s decisions in DFC Global Corp. v. 
Muirfield Value Partners, L.P. and Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event 
Driven Master Fund Ltd. lean toward acceptance of deal price as the primary, 
if not exclusive, means of measuring fair value, while retaining judicial 
discretion to use other methods where the sales process is not robust.177  
Factors the supreme court has found compelling when relying on deal price 
as the most reliable indication of fair value include an open and arm’s-length 
                                                          
 171.  See infra Section IV.A.1. 
 172.  A market is described as efficient  
if it has many stockholders; no controlling stockholder; “highly active trading”; and if 
information about the company is widely available and easily disseminated to the 
market. . . . In these circumstances, a mass of investors quickly digests all publicly 
available information about a company, and in trading the company’s stock, recalibrates 
its price to reflect the market’s adjusted, consensus valuation of the company.   
Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, 177 A.3d 1, 25 (Del. 2017) (quoting 
DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 373–74 (Del. 2017)). 
 173.  See infra Section IV.A.2. 
 174.  Golden Telecom, Inc., v. Glob. GT LP, 11 A.3d 214, 217 (Del. 2010). 
 175.  Dell, 177 A.3d at 21  (“This Court has relied on the statutory requirement that the Court of 
Chancery consider ‘all relevant factors’ to reject requests for the adoption of a presumption that the 
deal price reflects fair value if certain preconditions are met . . . .”); Golden Telecom, Inc., 11 A.3d 
at 217–18 (noting that requiring a presumption for deal price as fair value, “even in the face of a 
pristine, unchallenged transactional process, would contravene the unambiguous language of the 
statute”).  
 176.  See DFC, 172 A.3d at 366 (discussing the court of chancery’s proven record “in exercising 
its discretion to give the deal price predominant, and indeed exclusive weight, when it determines, 
based on the precise facts before it that led to the transaction, that the deal price is the most reliable 
evidence of fair value”); see cases cited supra note 132. 
 177.  DFC, 172 A.3d at 366–67; Dell, 177 A.3d at 21–24. 
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transaction process,178 the buyer’s easy access to non-public information,179 
a robust and fair sale process (often a non-conflicted, open market check),180 
and a well-functioning, efficient market.181  In comparison, the court found 
the deal price was not reliable evidence of fair value in Global GT LP v. 
Golden Telecom, Inc.182 because the transaction was conflicted and did not 
welcome buyers not already tied to the company’s major stockholders.183  In 
Golden Telecom, the seller (Golden Telecom) “did not engage in any sales 
                                                          
 178.  See Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (noting that the individuals who ran the sales process were 
“independent, experienced directors and armed with the power to say ‘no’”); DFC, 172 A.3d at 376 
(finding no conflict of interest in the sale from the record); Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., 
Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 59 (Del. Ch. 2007) (deferring to the deal price where an arm’s-length transaction 
was conducted).  
 179.  See DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (observing that the best evidence of fair value was the deal price 
because the deal price was “informed by robust public information, and easy access to deeper, non-
public information”); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 357–
58 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2005) (holding the deal price was the best indicator of fair value because the 
sales process “involved the broad dissemination of confidential information to a large number of 
prospective buyers.”). 
 180.  The transaction in DFC and other cases where the court of chancery has found the deal 
price was the most reliable evidence of fair value involved a robust and fair sale process, which 
often included a non-conflicted, open market check.  DFC, 172 A.3d at 351; see, e.g., Dell, 177 
A.3d at 35 (explaining that Dell’s sale process presented “fair play, low barriers to entry, outreach 
to all logical buyers, and the chance for any topping bidder to have the support of Mr. Dell’s own 
votes”); In re Appraisal of PetSmart, Inc., C.A. No. 10782-VCS, 2017 WL 2303599, at *27–*31 
(Del. Ch. May 26, 2017) (noting the “well-constructed and fairly implemented auction process”); 
Merion Capital LP v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc., C.A. No. 9320-VCL, 2016 WL 7324170, at 
*33 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016) (deferring to deal price because “[t]he Company ran a sale process 
that generated reliable evidence of fair value”); Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., C.A. No. 
8900-VCG, 2015 WL 6164771, at *18 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015) (finding the deal price to be the best 
indicator of fair value because it came from an “arm’s-length transaction negotiated over multiple 
rounds of bidding among interested buyers”); LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., C.A. 
No. 8094-VCP, 2015 WL 4540443, at *25 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (“[T]he [m]erger process was 
thorough and supports my reliance on the [deal] price as an indication of Ramtron’s fair value.”); 
Merlin Partners LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., C.A. No. 8590-VCN, 2015 WL 2069417, at *17 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 30, 2015) (asserting that any valuation method other than deal price is second best to derive 
fair value when “the market prices a company as the result of a competitive and fair auction”); In 
re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., C.A. No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 399726, at *23 (Del. Ch. Jan. 
30, 2015) (“[B]ecause the sales process here was robust, I find fair value in these circumstances best 
represented by the [deal] price.”); Huff Fund Inv. P’ship v. CKx, Inc., C.A. No. 6844-VCG, 2013 
WL 5878807, at *13 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013) (“The record . . . support[s] a conclusion that the 
process by which CKx was marketed to potential buyers was thorough, effective, and free from any 
spectre of self-interest or disloyalty.”), aff’d 2015 WL 631586 (Del. 2015).  These cases from 
approximately 2013 to 2017 mark a shift from earlier Delaware case law, which deferred less to 
deal prices, even with a robust sales process.  See, e.g., Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. GT LP, 11 
A.3d 214, 218 (Del. 2010) (“Requiring the Court of Chancery to defer—conclusively or 
presumptively—to the merger price, even in the face of a pristine, unchallenged transactional 
process, would contravene the unambiguous language of the statute and the reasoned holdings of 
our precedent.”).  
 181.  DFC, 172 A.3d at 349, 359; see supra note 172 for an explanation of efficient markets.  
 182.  993 A.2d 497 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010). 
 183.  Id. at 508. 
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efforts at all and instead concentrated solely on getting as good a deal as it 
could” from a single buyer (VimpelCom).184  But, Golden Telecom’s two 
largest shareholders owned more of VimpelCom than Golden Telecom, 
making the singular sale effort problematic due to major stockholders’ 
conflicted interest in the transaction, and made the deal price non-reflective 
of fair value.185  In DFC, the court held that the deal price should have been 
afforded greater weight in the fair value determination because there was an 
efficient market, no conflict of interest, every logical buyer had been 
approached about the deal, and there were no flaws in the sales process that 
could lead one to be suspicious that the deal price was not reflective of fair 
value.186  Similarly, in Dell, the Supreme Court held that stock price and deal 
price—both market-based indicators of value—are indicative of fair value 
when the market is efficient and “fair play, low barriers to entry, outreach to 
all logical buyers,” and a chance for the majority shareholder’s support is 
evidenced in the sales process.187   
The court decided Aruba correctly because the circumstances were 
similar enough to both DFC and Dell to also consider the deal price to be 
reliable evidence of fair value.  Aruba shopped the deal and approached a 
number of logical bidders, the market was efficient as evidenced by its near-
immediate reactions to published quarterly results, and Aruba engaged in a 
passive market check after the final merger agreement that did not bring forth 
a superior bid.188  Because the Aruba transaction had all the factors the Court 
relied on in DFC—for example, non-conflicted, open market check; robust 
public information; and a fair sale process—the Delaware Supreme Court 
correctly held that the chancery court abused its discretion by not using the 
deal price as evidence of fair value.189 
2.  The Court’s Holding Properly Acknowledges an Efficient Market 
Is Better Situated to Make Valuation Determinations 
The basic principle of appraisals—that a judicial proceeding can supply 
a more reliable valuation of shares than a market process—seems absurd.  An 
efficient market and business professionals with knowledge and expertise to 
make corporate finance calculations that best represent the fairest deal price 
are better situated than the court to determine fair value of shares.  In fact, 
allowing courts to value a company without any showing of process-based 
                                                          
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id.  
 186.  DFC, 172 A.3d at 376. 
 187.  Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, 177 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. 2017). 
 188.  Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 130 (Del. 2019) 
(en banc) (per curiam).  
 189.  Id. at 138–40. 
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wrongdoing or conflicted transactions goes entirely against the Delaware 
Corporate Law’s strong presumption that competitive markets are the best 
authorities of value.190  Corporate finance theories reflect the belief that the 
collective judgment of people with an incentive to estimate an asset’s future 
cash flows value and access to public information will produce a more 
reliable value than the view of a single analyst.191  The Delaware Supreme 
Court has endorsed reliance on efficient markets for a long time.192  
Additionally, many corporate finance methods, such as DCF analysis, 
involve a number of subjective inputs and guesswork that can vary in 
accuracy, and the efficient market and those professionals who have 
incentive to reach the most fair deal price are better situated to make these 
calculations as opposed to a legal-trained judge.193 
DFC and Dell recognized that, absent deficiencies in the deal process, 
the deal price should be given considerable weight when the buyer is in 
possession of material, nonpublic information because the buyer is uniquely 
incentivized to properly value the seller when agreeing to purchase the 
company.194  In Dell, the court decided the court of chancery improperly 
ignored the efficient market hypothesis and overturned the lower court’s 
decision.195  In Aruba, the chancery court below used the thirty-day 
unaffected average market price, meaning the thirty-day average of the price 
at which the shares traded before the media reported news of the merger.196  
The Delaware Supreme Court rejected that fair value determination because 
the unaffected price was several months before the valuation date, and the 
buyer had material, non-public information that would not be reflected in the 
                                                          
 190.  Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public 
Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1602 (2015). 
 191.  William J. Carney & Keith Sharfman, The Death of Appraisal Arbitrage: Ending Windfalls 
for Deal Dissenters, 43 DEL. J. CORP. L. 61, 88 (2018); see also Dell, 177 A.3d at 24 (discussing 
the efficient market hypothesis which “teaches that the price produced by an efficient market is 
generally a more reliable assessment of fair value than the view of a single analyst”); DFC, 172 
A.3d at 373 (describing the price produced by an efficient market as “informative of fair value”); 
id. at 373 n.144 (“In an efficient market you can trust prices, for they impound all available 
information about the value of each security.” (quoting RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES 
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 214 (2008))).  
 192.  Dell, 177 A.3d at 24; see also DFC, 172 A.3d at 370 (noting that “the relationship between 
market valuation and fundamental valuation has been strong historically”); id. at 370 n.121 (“[T]he 
extent to which company valuations based on the fundamental approach have matched stock market 
values over the past four decades is remarkable.” (quoting TIM KOLLER ET AL., VALUATION: 
MEASURING AND MANAGING THE VALUE OF COMPANIES 326 (2010))). 
 193.  Dell, 177 A.3d at 7; DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (“Like any factor relevant to a company’s future 
performance, the market’s collective judgment of the effect of regulatory risk may turn out to be 
wrong, but established corporate finance theories suggest that the collective judgment of the many 
is more likely to be accurate than any individual’s guess.”). 
 194.  DFC, 172 A.3d at 367; Dell, 177 A.3d at 35. 
 195.  Dell, 177 A.3d at 24. 
 196.  Aruba, 210 A.3d at 132. 
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market price.197  Therefore, the court decided correctly because it honored 
Delaware’s precedence of reliance on an efficient market and allowed for the 
business professionals, with access to material, non-public information, to 
make the more accurate valuation. 
B.  The Court’s Holding Will Likely Result in a Decline in Appraisal 
Suits 
Because the trilogy of DFC, Dell, and Aruba collectively held that in a 
robust market transaction deal price less synergies is strong evidence of fair 
value, the court of chancery, moving forward, will likely not award more than 
the deal price and, in fact, will likely award less than the deal price because 
synergies must be removed.198  Appraisal arbitrage cases are brought with the 
hope that the court will find fair value to be greater than the deal price.199  In 
a post-Aruba world, an appraisal case born from a non-conflicted, efficient 
market transaction will likely result in a court finding the fair value of shares 
to be the deal price or less, once synergies are subtracted.  Unless convincing 
evidence exists to show the transaction was conflicted, the market was 
inefficient, or a corporation failed their due diligence requirement, Delaware 
courts will likely use the fully informed, arm’s-length deal price as a fair 
value ceiling because synergies must then be deducted to determine fair 
value.  Deal price as a fair value ceiling supplies little incentive for hedge 
funds to engage in appraisal arbitrage as there is little hope for a valuation 
higher than the deal price.  As a result, the Delaware Chancery Court will 
likely see an overall decline in appraisal proceedings moving forward. 
From a public policy standpoint, a decline in appraisal arbitrage could 
lead to negative results.  Appraisal rights can serve as a check on abuse by 
corporate directors, controlling shareholders, and other insiders in merger 
transactions, just as the market serves as a check on general corporate 
governance.200  A decline in this check function, then, could have wide-
sweeping negative effects on market efficiency and trust in the market. 
But, because the DFC, Dell, and Aruba trilogy puts a heavy emphasis 
on arm’s-length transactions completed in a robust market, fewer appraisals 
could also have positive end results.  Appraisal arbitrage will not be attractive 
in instances of an unconflicted, fair price merger; whereas, mergers done in 
conflicted circumstances or objectively priced below fair value will 
incentivize appraisal arbitrageurs to seek appraisal and continue to serve as 
the market check.201 
                                                          
 197.  Id. at 138–39. 
 198.  Id. at 142. 
 199.  See supra Section II.B for a discussion of appraisal arbitrage. 
 200.  Korsmo & Myers, supra note 190, at 1598.  
 201.  Id. at 1599.  
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Another positive from a likely decrease in appraisal suits is the lessening 
of criticism placed on appraisal arbitrage.  Many arbitrage critics argue that 
the practice has turned into a burden of nuisance litigation from opportunistic 
investors.202  Others comment, similarly, that appraisal arbitrage creates 
uncertainty for an acquiring corporation and injects risk into the deal.203  This 
uncertainty creates “incentives for buyers to lower their price in anticipation 
of having to pay appraisal arbitragers post-closing and therefore shift[s] value 
away from long-term stockholders toward short-term arbitragers without 
advancing the public policy rationale for appraisal rights.”204 
Thus, the likely decline in appraisal arbitrage will produce a more 
positive than negative end result.  The appraisal remedy was created to 
compensate for a loss of voting rights to dissenting stockholders.205  
Arbitrageurs by definition do not need such compensation because they 
purchase the dissenting shares after the record date.206  Therefore, 
opportunistic arbitrageurs undermine the intent of the appraisal remedy and 
the decline in appraisal arbitrage following Aruba will likely lead to positive 
outcomes by returning the appraisal remedy to its originally contemplated 
purpose. 
C.  The Delaware Legislature Should Amend Section 262 to Reduce 
Uncertainty in Fair Value Determinations 
The Delaware legislature should amend section 262 of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law because the current law unwisely gives the 
chancery court judges full discretion to make their own corporate finance 
calculations to determine fair value, in addition to considering the expert 
calculations put forth by each party.  Delaware judges are renowned for their 
expertise in business matters.207  Despite this, it is unrealistic to expect judges 
to do a better job valuing companies than competitive markets or 
professionals with insider information.208  This flaw is evidenced by the 
                                                          
 202.  Id. at 1600.  The authors note that there is no empirical evidence supporting this fear, but 
it nonetheless remains a criticism of appraisal arbitrage.  Id.   
 203.  Stanley Onyeador, The Chancery Bank of Delaware: Appraisal Arbitrageurs Expose Need 
to Further Reform Defective Appraisal Statute, 70 VAND. L. REV. 339, 356 (2017). 
 204.  Daniel G. Dufner et al., Increasing Hostility Towards Appraisal Arbitrage, WHITE & CASE 
LLP (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications 
/alert-increasing-hostility-towards-appraisal-arbitrage.pdf.  
 205.  See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.  
 206.  See supra note 62 and accompanying text.  
 207.  Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate 
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1078 (2000) (“Delaware chancery judges are known for their 
expertise in business matters, and the court has developed a reputation for its sophistication in 
corporate law.”) 
 208.  Delaware Court of Chancery judges have expressed frustration with this expectation placed 
upon them.  See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc. C.A. No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 399726, 
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indecision of Vice Chancellor Laster in Aruba, and the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s highly critical opinion of his findings in the case on appeal.209  
Considering the imperfect and highly subjective methods used in corporate 
finance, it is likely better that, where possible, a law-trained judge is not the 
individual making an estimate of fair value based on their own calculations 
or “widely divergent partisan expert testimony.”210  
The supreme court in DFC and Dell acknowledged the mistakes made 
by chancery court judges in their fair value estimate calculations, along with 
the difficulties judges face when tasked with determining fair value.211  The 
DFC court recognized that the chancery court may be enticed to take every 
valuation method put forth by the varying briefs and expert reports on either 
side, give each method equal weight, and then label the average of those the 
fair value.212  Likewise, the Dell court described appraisals as “odd” and 
difficult because the burden “falls on the [trial] judge to determine fair value, 
using ‘all relevant factors’” while “considering the trial presentations and 
submissions of parties who have starkly different objectives: petitioners 
contend fair value far exceeds the deal price, and the company argues that 
fair value is the deal price or lower.”213  It is not contested that a lot is being 
asked of chancery court judges in appraisal proceedings.214  The Delaware 
legislature should consider removing the burden from judges to make fair 
value determinations because they “may not [have] a background well-suited 
to the [appraisal] process,” and are often asked to make difficult 
determinations that may be outside of their expertise.215 
                                                          
at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) (“I have commented elsewhere on the difficulties, if not outright 
incongruities, of a law-trained judge determining fair value of a company in light of an auction sale, 
aided by experts offering wildly different opinions on value.”); Huff Fund Inv. P’ship v. CKx, Inc., 
C.A. No. 6844-VCG, 2013 WL 5878807, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013) (noting the absurdity of a 
law-trained judge being asked to “substitute his own appraisal for those of . . . valuation experts” in 
a number of arenas).  
 209.  Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd v. Aruba Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 11448-VCL, 2018 
WL 922139, at *53–*54 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018), rev’d 210 A.3d 128 (Del. 2019); Aruba, 210 A.3d 
at 139–41. 
 210.  Dell, 177 A.3d at 35; Id. at 38 (observing the 1100 variable input values in the DCF 
analysis); see also DFC, 172 A.3d at 358 (noting the “sharp divide” between expert estimates of 
fair value due to disputes about the “proper inputs and methods” for a DCF analysis). 
 211.  See DFC, 172 A.3d at 361 (explaining “the Court of Chancery acknowledged that it had 
mistakenly included” modified instead of unmodified estimates in its value determination).  
 212.  Id. at 388.  
 213.  Dell, 177 A.3d at 19–20 (quoting In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, 2015 WL 399726, at 
*1).  
 214.  See Eric L. Talley, Finance in the Courtroom: Appraising Its Growing Pains, DEL. LAW., 
Summer 2017, at 16–17 (“[U]nlike highly trained (and highly remunerated) investment bankers—
whose job requires generating a ‘football field’ range of discounted cash flow (DCF) valuations—
a judge presiding over an appraisal proceeding must conjure up a single number at the end of the 
process.”).  
 215.  In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 WL 399726, at *1.  
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Additionally, whether or not judges are capable of understanding the 
valuation process, corporate law generally disapproves of the judiciary 
forcing its own opinion on whether something is a good business decision.216  
The use of deal price, when it is a product of arm’s-length negotiating, shaped 
in the “crucible of objective market reality,”217 has acquired (non-mandated) 
deference from judges following the DFC, Dell, and Aruba trilogy and 
provides a convenient reference point for judges that does not require lengthy 
corporate finance valuation metrics.  This is a move in the right direction 
toward alleviating judicial confusion in the value determination process; 
however, the solution could be to go one step further and amend the statute 
itself.  The court, at one time, experimented with retaining an independent 
expert to advise and consult on appraisal matters, and should go back to this 
in order to remove calculation responsibilities from the judges.218  
Independent experts were essentially required under the appraisal statute 
before 1976, when an appraisal case was initially determined by  a court-
appointed appraiser.219  The change to section 262, through an amendment in 
1976, allowed for the court to solely appraise the value of shares.220  This 
change was denoted as a cost-saving measure.221 
The use of an independent expert is not a new idea and has been 
suggested a number of times.222  The Delaware Supreme Court rejected the 
idea of an independent expert witness for valuation matters in Cede & Co v. 
Technicolor, Inc.,223 because “appointment of a combination special 
appraisal master/independent expert witness and the delegation of 
responsibility for valuing the Technicolor shares is unlawful because it is 
contrary to the statutory mandate that ‘the Court [of Chancery] shall appraise 
the shares.’”224 
A likely reason the statute has not yet been amended is the landscape of 
Delaware corporate lawmaking.  Local interest groups, made up largely of 
the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association, control much 
                                                          
 216.  Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 83 (2004). 
 217.  Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. Ch. 2007).  
 218.  See Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 360–61 (Del. 1997) 
(discussing the history of Delaware’s use of disinterested appraisers under section 262, until the 
statute was amended in 1976 to eliminate that requirement).   
 219.  Id.  
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Id.  
 222.  In re Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1222 (Del. 1992) (“[I]f the Court is limited to the biased 
presentation of the parties, it is often forced to pick and choose from a limited record without the 
benefit of objective analysis and opinion.  To compensate for this handicap, the Court of Chancery 
should consider, in a proper case, appointing its own expert witness.”). 
 223.  758 A.2d 485 (Del. 2000).   
 224.  Id. at 487 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h)).   
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of the corporate legislation in the state.225  The Delaware legislature is known 
to rely on the expertise of the Delaware Bar Association to guide its corporate 
lawmaking.226  As noted by Professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, 
rules put forth by the Delaware Bar that increase litigation, such as rules that 
stimulate disputes over appraisal rights, could increase legal fees for those 
who practice corporate law in Delaware.227  The Delaware Bar’s desire to 
keep appraisal arbitrage in its current state was evidenced by its actions 
following the Transkaryotic decision that spurred the dramatic increase in 
appraisal arbitrage.  The Council of the Corporate Law Section of the 
Delaware State Bar Association made two reform proposals to section 262, 
but notably, the Council did not propose legislation to overrule the 
Transkaryotic decision.228  Although an amendment to use independent 
valuation experts in appraisals is adverse to the Delaware Bar Association’s 
financial interests, doing so will aid Delaware in maintaining its preeminent 
status as the nation’s leading supplier of corporate law.   
Because the chancery court’s ability to rely on independent experts is 
plainly restricted by the requirement that the court make its own independent 
determination of fair value, the Delaware legislature should amend the statute 
to allow for such reliance, despite various interest groups’ desires, to better 
effectuate the purposes of the dissenting shareholder’s appraisal rights. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., the 
Delaware Supreme Court held that the chancery court abused its discretion 
when it used the unaffected thirty-day market price average as fair value 
instead of deal price less synergies.229  The court correctly held there is no 
definitive formula for determining fair value, but that deal price is the best 
indicator of fair value in this case because the deal was a fully informed, 
arm’s-length transaction that occurred after a robust sales process.230  In 
conflicted transactions or transactions with a poorly run sales process, the 
deal price is not reflective of fair value, but other valuation methodologies, 
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such as the discounted cash flow analysis or comparable companies analysis, 
may be better suited for a fair value determination.231 
The practical result of the court’s holding will likely be a decline in 
appraisal proceedings, more specifically appraisal arbitrage, in fully 
informed, arm’s-length transactions because the deal price will likely serve 
as the ceiling for fair value determinations, removing incentive for 
arbitrageurs to bring appraisal suits.232  The decline in appraisal arbitrage 
following Aruba will likely lead to positive outcomes by returning the 
appraisal remedy to its originally contemplated purpose, to compensate for a 
loss of voting rights to dissenting stockholders.233  Appraisal arbitrage will 
not be attractive in instances of an unconflicted, fair price merger; whereas, 
mergers completed in conflicted circumstances or objectively priced below 
fair value will incentivize appraisal arbitrageurs to seek appraisal and 
continue to serve as the market check against abuse by corporate directors, 
controlling shareholders, and other insiders in merger transactions.234 
The DFC, Dell, Aruba trilogy also marks general judicial confusion and 
discord on proper methodologies to appraise company shares.  But, the court 
of chancery’s ability to rely on independent experts is plainly restricted by 
the statutory requirement that the court make its own independent 
determination of fair value.235  To avoid future judicial confusion in appraisal 
proceedings, the Delaware legislature should amend Delaware General 
Corporation Law section 262 to allow for a neutral valuation professional to 
advise the court of chancery.236  
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